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Lewis et al. (2011) attempted to restore the reputation of Samuel George Morton, a 19th century
physician who reported on the skull sizes of different folk-races. Whereas Gould (1978) claimed that
Morton’s conclusions were invalid because they reflected unconscious bias, Lewis et al. alleged that
Morton’s findings were, in fact, supported, and Gould’s analysis biased. We take strong exception to
Lewis et al.’s thesis that Mortonwas “right.” Wemaintain that Gould was right to reject Morton’s analysis
as inappropriate and misleading, but wrong to believe that a more appropriate analysis was available.
Lewis et al. fail to recognize that there is, given the dataset available, no appropriate way to answer any of
the plausibly interesting questions about the “populations” in question (which in many cases are not
populations in any biologically meaningful sense). We challenge the premise shared by both Gould and
Lewis et al. that Morton’s confused data can be used to draw anymeaningful conclusions. This, we argue,
reveals the importance of properly focusing on the questions asked, rather than more narrowly on the
data gathered.
 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.When citing this paper, please use the full journal title Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences1. Introduction
Samuel Morton was a 19th century physician, sometimes
credited with founding physical anthropology in the U.S., who
cataloged and measured skulls. Gould (1978) famously argued that
Morton’s work (Morton, 1849) reflected unconscious manipulation
to fit racist stereotypes. Lewis et al. (2011) posthumously rehabili-
tated Morton, arguing that it was Gould who fudged the results.
Lewis et al.’s article received significant press, both popular and
scientific. Much of the press took their work to have “debunked”
Gould’s claims regarding the influence of Morton’s unconscious
biases on his analyses. As the New York Times put it: “Study De-
bunks Stephen Jay Gould’s Claim of Racism on Morton Skulls”
(Wade, 2011); Nature claimed that Lewis et al.’s research showed(J.M. Kaplan).
., et al., Gould on Morton, Re
medical Sciences (2015), httthat “Gould’s staunch opposition to racism, and desire to make an
example of Morton, may have biased his interpretation of Morton’s
data” (Mismeasure for Mismeasure, 2011).
Lewis et al. note that “were Gould still alive, we expect he would
have mounted a defense of his analysis of Morton”; this is not that
defense.1 Rather, while we agree with Lewis et al. that Gould’s
statistical analysis of Morton’s data is in many ways no better than
Morton’s own, we believe that Lewis et al.’s work is at least equally
problematic. Gould was, in our view, right to recognize that there
was something very wrong with Morton’s analysis; but he went
wrong himself in trying to find a “better” analysis. Lewis et al. are
right that Gould’s analysis isn’t better, but wrong to think that
Morton’s is appropriate. Further, both Lewis et al.’s analysis of the
role that Gould’s work on Morton plays in the literature, and of the1 Michael Weisberg’s “Remeasuring Man” (2014) comes rather closer to
providing such a defense.
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best, misleading. Finally, the uncritical “exoneration” of Morton by
Lewis et al. incorrectly implies that there was nothing very wrong
with either Morton’s methods, or with his overall project. We reject
both implications.
We have two main goals in this paper. The first is to note the
ways in which the adequacy of the evidence gathered depends
critically on the questions one is trying to answer. Gould suggests
that Morton had a very specific question in mind regarding race,
average cranial capacity, and intelligence. But Morton’s evidence
was not adequate to address this question, and Gould’s attempts to
find better analyses of the data are equally problematic. Lewis et al.
fail to appreciate the problems with Morton’s data, and give the
impression that while Gould’s analysis is mistaken, the project as a
whole is reasonable. A more careful consideration of the relation-
ship between the data gathered and the questions that can be
answered can helpmake clear whyMorton’s data cannot be used to
answer the questions attributed to him.
Our second goal is to counter some important problemswith the
Lewis et al. piece. As noted above, the Lewis et al. article received
significant attention in the popular media. But many of the claims
made by Lewis et al. in their article are misleading in important
ways, and, as we make clear, much of the media attention focused
on themostmisleading aspects. It is impossible, reading Lewis et al.,
not to be led to the conclusion that Gould’s work was badly flawed,
and that Morton’s was broadly correct. This is, for the reasons we
suggest below, not the case. But the kind of sloppiness that Lewis
et al. engaged in has real consequencesde.g., members of theWhite
Supremacist website “StormFront” immediately trumpeted Lewis
et al.’s results as proving that Gould was “a fraud,” and took them to
be broadly supportive of their explicitly racist agenda,2 a view
apparently shared by many in related communities.3
We begin this paper with Lewis et al.’s re-measurements of the
skulls in Morton’s collection. Their discussion of the re-
measurement takes up a significant portion of their paper, and
much, indeed most, of the media coverage focused on this aspect of
their work. We argue that this re-measurement was completely
irrelevant to an evaluation of Gould’s published analysis of Morton;
the exercise was pointless, and there was no legitimate reason to
feature the results of that work. The space Lewis et al. devote to
their re-measurement of the skulls, as well as the media attention it
garnered, form part of a larger pattern of a reframing of Gould’s
criticisms of Morton that is, again, at best misleading. We next
explore briefly some of the ways in which Lewis et al.’s article
misrepresents Gould’s basic claims, as well as misrepresenting the
ways in which Gould’s claims are generally interpreted and used.
Gould’s actual disagreement with Morton, we maintain, was a
disagreement about the correct methods to deploy in the analysis of
Morton’s data; Gould argued that Morton’s choices (which skulls to
include and which to exclude, how to compute averages, etc.) were
the result of unconscious biases on Morton’s part. Lewis et al.
counter that Morton’s choices, far from being the result of racist
biases, were objectively sound, and that Gould’s choices were
influenced by his own biases, and were unsound.We argue that the
methods deployed by Morton and Gould were both inappropriate.
Given how the skulls were actually collected, there are no inter-
esting ways to summarize the dataset in order to draw broader2 See e.g. https://www.stormfront.org/forum/t861796-8/#post9942864 accessed
11/16/2014.
3 See e.g. http://www.occidentaldissent.com/2011/06/14/the-mismeasure-of-
man-stephen-j-gould-refuted/ and http://www.theoccidentalobserver.net/2011/
06/stephen-jay-gould-next-to-judas-iscariot-brutus-and-cassius-in-the-devil%E2%
80%99s-mouth-at-the-center-of-hell/. Accessed 11/16/2014.
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the skulls Morton happened to have in his collection are, we
maintain, notworth asking, let alone trying to answer.We note here
aswell thatwhile the application ofmodern statistical techniques to
the skulls in Morton’s collection can tell us something about that
collection, at best such methods provide more reasons to think that
the data from the collection cannot be used as it stands to answer
the sorts of questions Gould believed Morton was asking.2. Remeasuring skulls4
Lewis et al. (2011) remeasured 308 skulls from Morton’s
collection; their results, correcting for systematic changes due to
methodological differences, align well with the results Morton re-
ported in his 1849 “catalog” of skulls (Morton, 1849). While their
report of this undertaking is only about a quarter of the substantive
text of their article, it was the focus of most of the media com-
mentary on their work. For example, NicholasWade, writing for the
New York Times, declared:
They identified and remeasured half of the skulls used in his
reports, finding that in only 2 percent of cases did Morton’s
measurements differ significantly from their own. These errors
either were random or gave a larger than accurate volume to
African skulls, the reverse of the bias that Dr. Gould imputed to
Morton. (Wade, 2011)
Writing for Wired, Brandon Keim claimed that:
In a study published June 7 in Public Library of Science Biology,
researchers led by anthropologists Jason Lewis of Stanford
University and the Paleoanthropology Institute’s David DeGusta
re-measured 308 skulls on which Morton had published data.
Their conclusion: Morton’s numbers differed significantly from
their own in just 7 cases, and those few mismeasurements
didn’t favor the narrative of Caucasian superiority that Gould
ascribed to Morton’s motivation. (Keim, 2011)
A New York Times editorial noted that:
Now a team of six physical anthropologists has filled almost half
the skulls with pellets and concluded that Morton’s data were
generally reliable and not manipulated. (“Bias and the
Beholder,” 2011)
And an editorial in Nature claimed:
Now, in a paper published on 7 June, Jason Lewis, an anthro-
pologist at Stanford University in California, and his colleagues
test Gould’s assertions in detail. They remeasured the volume of
some 300 skulls in Morton’s collection, which survives at the
University of Pennsylvania’s Museum of Archaeology and An-
thropology in Philadelphia, while taking care to blind them-
selves to knowledge of the population that each skull came
from. Comparing their measurements to Morton’s, they find no
evidence that his were distorted by bias. (“Mismeasure for
Mismeasure,” 2011)
Finally, note that in a press release for an exhibition on race from
the Penn Museum, where one of the study’s co-authors (Janet
Monge) is a curator and was a consulting scholar on the exhibition
being announced, it is claimed that:
Gould’s charges, the first to popularly discredit Morton’s scien-
tificmethodology, were not challenged until researchers at Penn4 While developed independently, our analysis here is very similar to Weisberg’s
(2014).
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6 Other writers have explored possible reasons for the inclusion of, and the
prominence given to, the skull re-measurements by Lewis et al. (2011), focusing on
the problematic way in which the skulls were “acquired,” and the continued con-
troversy over arguments for the repatriation of, especially, native American re-
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That team found them largely accurate. (“Morton collection of
human crania” 2013)
But from the standpoint of evaluating Gould’s published claims,
the re-measurement was completely pointless. Gould never
claimed that Morton’s shot-based measurements, which is what
Lewis et al. compared their new measurements to, were unreliable.
Rather, Gould explicitly stated that he assumes “as Morton con-
tends, that measurements with shot were objective and invariably
repeatable to within 100^ 3” (Gould, 1978 507). In his The Mismeasure
of Man, Gould is even more straightforward, and states simply that
after Morton switched to lead shot, Morton “achieved consistent
results that never varied by more than a single inch for the same
skull” (Gould, 1981 53). Gould did not “bother” to re-measure the
skulls, because Gould explicitly stated that, once Morton developed
a method that made the unconscious “fudging” of the results
difficult, the results became reliable. For Gould what was of interest
was the difference in the kinds of results obtained when a less
reliable method (seed) was used, and those obtained when a more
reliable method (lead shot) was used; Gould hypothesized that the
less reliable method permitted more room for unconscious bias to
influence the results (Gould, 1978 505).
This is also why no one should have considered Michael’s pre-
vious re-measurements of the skulls in Morton’s collection
(Michael, 1988) a “refutation” of Gould. Insofar as Michael was
testing “whether Morton accurately measured cranial capacity
using shot” (p. 350), he was testing something about which Gould
never expressed any doubts. It is unfortunate that this aspect of
Michael’s work received, as far as we can tell, essentially all the
attention garnered by that article; as in Lewis et al., remeasuring
the skulls was, from the standpoint of evaluating Gould’s published
claims, a complete waste of time, and detracted from Michael’s
other (in some cases much more incisive) considerations regarding
Gould’s analysis of Morton.5
Lewis et al. were certainly not ignorant of Gould’s claim that the
shot-based measurements were to be trusted; what reason, then,
did they give for the re-measurements? They claim that if “Gould’s
hypothesis that Morton physically mismeasured some skulls due to
racial bias were correct, we would expect the mismeasured crania
to be non-randomly distributed by population” (Lewis et al. 20113).
Since, for the most part, Morton’s measurements using shot were
accurate, and, for all but one population, “Morton’s errors were
random with respect to population,” Lewis et al. conclude that “[t]
hese results falsify the claim that Morton physically mismeasured
crania based on his a priori biases” (Lewis et al. 2011 3).
Again, recall that Gould explicitly stated that the shot-based
measurements, unlike the seed-based measurements, were trust-
worthy; Gould simply never claimed that the shot-based mea-
surements were subject to manipulation via unconscious bias at all.
Gould did not claim that, once Morton switched to shot, Morton
“physically mismeasured some skulls”dhe in fact states the exact
opposite of this. Lewis et al. are here falsifying (their word) a claim
that Gould never made.5 Some authors cited by Lewis et al. (2011) criticize Gould for failing to take
Michael’s work seriously, but their focus is entirely on Michael’s re-measurements,
ignoring Michael’s much more important contributiondthe recognition that the
assumptions Gould made in his statistical (re)analysis of the skull volume data were
no better justified than those of Morton, and that no statistical analysis would (or
even could), in this case, provide the “right” answer. Michael has since published a
four part blog post on issues related to Gould, Lewis et al., and Morton, and, while
we do not agree with all of his claims, we again find his views to be much more
subtle and well-considered than those expressed in Lewis et al. (2011), DeGusta &
Lewis (2011), and the various authors of Lewis et al. (2011) in interviews.
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errors onMorton’s part, that would have been an interesting result;
it would have implied that Gould was in fact wrong to trust even
Morton’s shot-based results. But that is not what they found. While
it is important to publish negative results, framing those results in
ways that suggest that they refute other people’s claims, when they
do no such thing, is at least misleading, if not dishonest. The
physical re-measurement of the skulls, providing evidence that
Gould was right to trust Morton’s shot-based measurements,
cannot possibly have warranted more than a short footnote based
on the real intellectual interest of the result. Unless Lewis et al.
meant their findings to bemisunderstood, it is hard to imaginewhy
they included them so prominently, and why they wrote in ways
that strongly imply that they have somehow shown Gould to be in
error, when they must have known that they had done no such
thing.63. Seed versus shot measurements: room for bias?
Gould notes that whenMortonmoved from using seeds to using
shot, there were changes in the average skull volumes measured;
that these changes were not uniform across Morton’s “racial”
groupings is, Gould thought, some evidence of bias. Gould claimed
that “Indian” skulls originally measured with seed that were then
remeasured with shot increased by an average of 2.2”^3, and that a
reasonable estimate of the change in “Caucasian” skull measure-
ments between seed and shot is about 1.8”^3. For “Africans,” how-
ever, Gould’s best estimate for the increase moving between seed
and shot based measurement is closer to 5.4”^3 (Gould, 1978 506e
507). This, Gould argued, is some evidence that, when a method
that was more easily subject to unconscious bias was used (seeds),
the native “Africans” were systematically disadvantaged (Gould,
1978 507). Gould suggested that this systematic disadvantage
was, of course, avoided once Morton switched to a reliable method
of measurement, one not subject to unconscious manipulation.
Except for the Native American skulls, Morton did not list in-
dividual measurements in his 1839 book (Morton, 1839), and hence
Gould did not have access to the individual skull measurements
taken with seed that formed the corresponding samples. Indeed,
since not all skulls from either the “Caucasian” or “African” samples
from 1839 were remeasured with shot, Gould was forced to make
some guesses about which skulls from the 1849 catalog (Morton,
1849) formed the 1839 samples. (Lewis et al. reconstruct Gould’s
reasoning, and find 18 skulls in the 1849 sample that were likely
remeasured from the 1839 sample). Since not every skull included
in the 1839 estimate was remeasured, Gould was unable to deter-
minewhat, precisely, the seed-based average from that remeasured
subset of the 1839 samples was. He argued that it was unlikely to bemains. See, e.g. Jason Antrosio’s comments on this at his “Living Anthropologically”
Blog http://www.livinganthropologically.com/2011/06/14/mismeasuring-gould/
(accessed 7/17/2013). Similarly, an editorial in Nature notes that “[s]everal in the
group have an association with the University of Pennsylvania, and have an interest
in seeing the valuable but understudied skull collection freed from the stigma of
bias (although, as for many nineteenth-century museum collections, its ethically
dubious assembly will remain an issue). (Mismeasure for Mismeasure, 2011 419).
Along these lines, Monge, one of the study’s authors and “Curator-In-Charge and
Keeper of the Physical Anthropology Section, University of Pennsylvania Museum of
Archaeology and Anthropology,” stated in an interview that Morton’s collection
may be “more useful now than in Morton’s time,” because “the skulls give a
snapshot of humanity in the 1800s” (“Report: Skull Study” 2011). We argue below
that they provide no such snapshot.
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8 Michael forcefully reminds us (personal communication) that after the publi-
cation of Mismeasure, Gould’s public talks and interviews on Morton painted
Morton in a much less flattering light than does his published work. But in the work
cited by Lewis et al., Gould remained carefully respectful of Morton, and gives no
hint that he thought of Morton as anything but honest and careful. That Gould in
fact said things more similar to what Lewis et al. attribute to him in other, uncited
sources, does not excuse their misrepresentation of his published works.
9 As noted, in our view, Gould’s published writing reveals a real respect for
Morton’s intellectual honesty; Gould clearly stresses, in his written work, that
Morton both wanted to get things right, and tried to do so. While in the article
itself, Lewis et al. pretend to a similar respect for Gould, there is good evidence that
at least some of the authors are being disingenuous about their actual views here,
and believe Gould to be guilty of conscious fraud and data-manipulation. Holloway,
one of the co-authors, is quoted as saying that “I just didn’t trust Gould. I had the
feeling that his ideological stance was supreme. When the 1996 version of ‘The
Mismeasure of Man’ came and he never even bothered to mention Michael’s study,
I just felt he was a charlatan” (Wade, 2011). And Nature, in their editorial on the
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skulls Morton did remeasure, since there is no reason to think that
the subset that was remeasured was particularly large or otherwise
special; in any event, Gould maintained, in order to account for
most of the discrepancy between the difference in moving from
seed to shot in Native Americans and Native Africans, one would
have to make heroic assumptions about the smallness of the Native
African skulls that were not remeasured (Gould, 1978 507).
Michael (1988) argued that a) since there is no sign of mis-
measurement in the 1849 shot-based data, and b) the statistical
analyses that Morton performed were not, contra Gould, clearly
biased, there is no reason to suspect that the 1839 seed-based
measurements were biased, minor (and statistically untested)
anomalies notwithstanding (p. 353). This is the same line of
reasoning adopted by Lewis et al., who note that the seed-based
measurements were far more variable and suggest that the small
sample size and large errors in seed measurements might account
for the discrepancy. They argue that “[r]ather than bias, the source
of changes between Morton’s seed-based and shot-based cranial
capacities is more likely that stated by Morton himself: mistakes in
the seed measurements” (Lewis et al. 2011 4).
But as Gould noted in his 1978 article, the larger error in seed-
based measurements “will increase the variance, but it need not
alter the mean for a series of skulls” (Gould, 1978 505). Here, the
mean did change, and did so substantially. Without knowing the
individual seed-based skull measurements for Native Africans in
the 1839 sample (nor even the standard deviation of the sample), it
is impossible to directly test the likelihood of generating such
different results by chance alone. But, since we do have access to a
large collection of individual seed-based skull measurements that
were remeasured (the Native American sample), what we can do is
to test Lewis et al.’s hypothesis that the larger errors inherent in
seed-based measurements, coupled with the smaller sample size,
makes such differences in the changes found when moving be-
tween seed and shot relatively likely. We chose samples of 18 skulls
at random from those Native American skulls measured with seed
and remeasured with shot, and computed the change in the mean
size between seed and shot. The results indicate that the chances of
getting a change of over 5 cubic inches was tiny (far less than 1%;
see Supplemental Materials, online). The higher standard deviation
of the seed-based data and small sample size are therefore, on their
own, very unlikely to account for the difference between the
average increase in skull size in the Native American samples and
the average increase in the Native African samples. While we
cannot single out the sort of unconscious bias to which Gould
appealed as the only possibility (there is no way to rigorously test
for the possibility of some combination of unfortunate skull se-
lection and chance, and other scenarios surely exist), the possibility
of bias in the seed-based (not the shot-based) measurements
remains.7
In short, the claim that the discrepancy between the seed-based
and shot-based results can be attributed merely to the higher
variance of seed-based results and small sample size is refuted by
our analysis (Weisberg makes a qualitatively similar point; 2014
172). Again, we feel it is important to stress that insofar as (un-
conscious) bias was a factor in the seed-based measurements,
Gould argued that Morton himself recognized that the seed-based
measurements were unreliable, wanted to find a more reliable
method, and successfully addressed this problem by switching to
shot.7 Michael notes (personal communication) that so far, at least, no one has tested
whether the kinds of unconscious manipulations Gould suggested Morton and his
assistant might have engaged in are easier using seed than using shot.
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To anyone familiar with the published work of Gould on Morton
that Lewis et al. cite, the following claim from Lewis et al. strikes an
oddly false note: “But it was Morton’s work on human skulls that
drew first Gould’s interest, then his ire” (Lewis et al. 20111).8 This is
a strange line, because, if anything, the impression one gets from
Gould’s published writing on Mortondthe work Lewis et al. cit-
edis not that Morton drew Gould’s “ire” but rather than Gould had
a real (if sometimes grudging) respect for Morton and his work. In
his 1978 paper, after all, Gould is not interested in “fraud” or “sci-
entific misconduct” (more on this below), but rather in the sorts of
unconscious biases and short-sightedness that even the most
scrupulous and honest researchers can suffer from. And his
recommendation for dealing with these kinds of biases is, explicitly,
that we act more like Morton: “I only raise what I regard as a
pressing issue with two hopes for alleviationdfirst, that by
acknowledging the existence of such a large middle ground, we
may examine our own activity more closely; second, that we may
cultivate, as Morton did, the habit of presenting candidly all our
information and procedure, so that others can assess what we, in
our blindness, cannot” (Gould, 1978 504e505).
Gould credits Morton with recognizing that the measurements
performed with seed were unreliable, and switching to a more
reliable method, one less easily manipulated by unconscious biases.
Gould writes that: “Indeed, we know that Morton himself began to
worry. He had hired assistants to measure the Indian crania, but,
distressed by errors and inconsistencies, he later took to making all
measurements himself with lead shot” (Gould, 1978 505). Gould
never accuses Morton of wanting biased results, or of consciously
trying to manipulate data; rather, he suggests, in his 1978 article
and in Mismeasure, that Morton went out of his way to try to get
accurate answers, and to avoid unreliable results when he could.
Gould writes that he finds “no indication of fraud or conscious
manipulation. [Morton] explained everything he did, and pub-
lished all his raw data.” (Gould, 1978 509). Nowhere in the article,
nor in Gould’s The Mismeasure of Man, can we find any hint of
Gould’s suggesting that Morton was anything other than a careful
and honest researcher, albeit one blind to his own unconscious
biases and pre-conceptions about racial hierarchies, biases that
were, after all, quite common in the cultural context in which
Morton was born and raised.9study, notes that “Although the new paper does not accuse Gould of intentionally
misrepresenting Morton, some of its authors have raised this possibility in in-
terviews, noting that Gould’s oversights would be less troubling were he known to
be a less meticulous scholar.” (Mismeasure for Mismeasure, 2011 419). We note in
passing that, while he was alive, Gould was called many things, but “meticulous
scholar” was not often among them, even by his supporters.
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viewed as a canonical example of scientific misconduct” (Lewis
et al. 2011 1). They reiterate later that “Morton has become a ca-
nonical example of scientific misconduct and an oft-told cautionary
tale of how human variation is inevitably mismeasured” (Lewis
et al. 2011 2), and finally that “Samuel George Morton, in the
hands of Stephen Jay Gould, has served for 30 years as a textbook
example of scientific misconduct” (Lewis et al. 2011 5). These are
odd claims, not least because it was very important to Gould’s
stated aim in his 1978 piece that Morton not be guilty of “scientific
misconduct.” It is, rather, critical to Gould’s project of revealing the
ways in which unconscious biases and assumptions can result in
honest, careful scientists producing mistaken results, that Morton
be an honest, careful scientist, trying to generate correct results10.
Might it be the case, for all of Gould’s care in laying out his
project, that his work was misinterpreted as showing that Morton
was guilty of scientific misconduct? It is possible, of course, but the
only authors we can find who make that mistake are authors who
are attacking Gould’s work. Lewis et al. themselves cite no text-
books that imply that Gould’s analysis shows that Morton
committed scientific misconduct or fraud, andwe have been able to
find none; Lewis et al. do cite three works in support of their claim
that Gould’s analysis is often used to attribute scientific misconduct
and fraud to Morton, but what none of these authors do is provide
any references or citations to articles or books that in fact make that
mistake. Cook, whose work is cited to support the claim that
“Samuel George Morton, in the hands of Stephen Jay Gould, has
served for 30 years as a textbook example of scientific misconduct”
in fact mentions neither scientific misconduct, nor fraud, nor any
other obvious synonyms; she claims that her “experience in
teaching Gould’s paper to undergraduates has been that Gould
unfairly brands Morton as racist” (Cook, 2006 40), not that Gould’s
analysis has made Morton out to be an exemplar of scientific
misconduct. Lewis et al.’s reference to her is especially odd given
that they state that “Morton indeed. assigned a plethora of
different attributes to various groups, often in highly racist fashion”
(Lewis et al. 20115); we hope it is obvious that it is hard to reconcile
Morton being unfairly branded as a racist with this claim. One can
argue about whether Morton’s obvious racism is a moral failing,
given how common such views were at the time he was working,
but, given what Morton writes about the “character” of non-white
peoples, we cannot imagine how calling him a racist is anything
other than descriptively accurate.11
Buikstra (2009) is similarly interested in defending Morton, and
in her introduction to the reproduction of Morton’s Crania Ameri-
cana does so with vigor. What she doesn’t do, however, is provide
any evidence in support of Lewis et al.’s claim that “Gould’s analysis
of Morton is widely read, frequently cited, and still commonly
assigned in university courses” (Lewis et al. 2011 2), which is the
claim Lewis et al. cite her work to support. Brace (2005) likewise
presents a spirited defense of Morton’s work, understood in
context. Again, however, what this does not do is provide any10 Much of our argument regarding the important distinction between “miscon-
duct” and “unconscious bias,” as well as Lewis et al.’s failure to cite work that
actually defends their claims, was anticipated by Jonathan Marks’ (2011) blog post
“Plotz biology” on his “Anthropomics” blog (Marks, 2011), and we have made use of
some of his analysis in developing our own; while any errors introduced here are
our own, much of the credit should go to Marks.
11 “Racism” is a contested term (see e.g. Doane, 2006), and it is beyond the score
of this paper to engage in the literature on defining racism. But Morton attributes
morally loaded characteristics to “racial” populations in quite wildly offensive ways,
ways that surely count as racist on any reasonable definition (see e.g. various de-
scriptions of populations in Morton, 1839). Again, whether, given the time period in
which he was writing, we should think of his racism as a (major) moral failing is a
different issue.
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insofar as Brace in fact cites Gould in order to criticize the latter’s
interpretation of Morton. Still less does Brace suggest that Gould’s
analysis can be related to claims of “scientific misconduct” on
Morton’s partdindeed, Brace is quite explicit that Gould’s inter-
pretation is that Morton was not guilty of fraud or misconduct, but
of unconscious bias; interestingly, Brace attributes Gould’s poor
treatment of Morton to this same kind of unconscious bias on
Gould’s part (Brace, 2005 88).
In short, there is a troubling disconnect between what Gould
actually claimed, and what Lewis et al. attribute to him, as well
between what other authors have in fact written about Gould on
Morton, and how Lewis et al. interpret Gould’s place in the litera-
ture on Morton. This disconnect is especially striking in light of the
claim, noted in the editorial in Nature, that the Lewis et al.’s
manuscript “spent eight months in the review process at PLoS
Biology” (Mismeasure for Mismeasure, 2011 419).5. Questions and the statistical techniques to address them:
why there is no right answer
Gould wrote as if it was obvious that Morton’s purpose in
measuring the volumes of the skulls was to demonstrate that the
“races” Morton recognized could be ranked by intellectual ability,
using brain size as the proxy. With this question in mind, Gould
attempted to show that Morton’s statistical manipulations were
poorly justified. If Morton actually had a question like Gould’s in
mind, Gould was surely right that Morton’s statistical analysis falls
far short of providing a defensible answer. But Gould’s own sta-
tistical manipulations are no better able to answer the question
Gould imagines that Morton is asking. Gould is simply wrong to
argue that the question he supposes Morton is asking can in fact be
answered by the data Morton had gathered. We would suggest, in
line with Brace (2005), that it was at least in part because Gould
was able to get an answer that he liked better than Morton’s that
Gould was unable or unwilling to see that his own statistical
manipulationsdhis own decisions about which skulls to include,
which to exclude, how to group them into populations, and how to
perform the analyses in questiondwere (at best) no better justified
than Morton’s. In this section, we present our reasons for thinking
that Morton’s skulls cannot be used to answer (some of) the sorts of
questions people have tried to answer using them.
If Morton’s project was driven by a desire to find a way to
objectively rank the races by intelligence (Gould, 1978 503), quib-
bles over the best statistical approaches, and which particular sub-
populations or individual skulls to include or exclude, seem
misguided. The more important problem is that reaching conclu-
sions about the “average” cranial capacity of the various “races”
requires that one has a defensible position regarding what it means
to generate a population average for cranial capacity, a defensible
way of recognizing biologically meaningful populations, and a
defensible way of gathering a representative sample of skulls from
the relevant populations in order to take the relevant measure-
ments. But no such defenses are available in this case. Indeed, the
lack of clarity about what constituted a “race,” how the “races” and
populations identified as sub-populations within races were
related to each other, what, precisely, the question being asked
about average capacities even was, and the implausibility of
treating the skulls gathered as representative samples of the pop-
ulations to which they were assigned, render the statistical quib-
bles moot, and make Gould’s answers no more defensible than
Morton’s. If Morton’s project was, as Gould believed, to rank the
“races” by intellectual ability on the basis of skull volume, the
project was hopelessly confused from the start.dux: What can the debate reveal about the limits of data?, Studies in
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pacity of members of the “Indian” or “Native American” race, what,
exactly, was he trying to find the average of? Perhaps he meant the
average adult cranial capacity, and hence should exclude children
(Morton in fact sets the cut-off at the age of 16, arguing that the
brains of people under this age were still growing; see 1849 VII).
Should we also exclude skulls from those individuals identified as
“insane” (by whom?) or from so-called “idiots”12 or from those
with badly “deformed” skulls (what counts as “deformed” here?
What standard should be used as the cut-off?)? Why or why not?
Shouldwe exclude African Americans, many of whom are amixture
of African and European heritage (ignoring for the moment the fact
that “Africans” themselves do not constitute either a population or
a race)? Why or why not? (Morton in fact treats them as a separate
sub-population, at the same level as the “Native African Family,” see
1849 VI and VIII.) Should we include first-generation offspring of
“native” Americans and (nearly) contemporary Europeans? Those
with “at least” three “native” grandparents? At least two? Why or
why not? Should we worry about the “admixture” of different
“native” populations within the Americas? Why or why not?
Turning from the difficulties with deciding what sorts of in-
dividuals should be part of our averages, what is it, precisely, that
we are trying to find the average of? Should we, for example, be
worried about the fact that the total population of “native” Amer-
icans in 1839 was vastly reduced from its historical high, due to
genocide, disease, and other “influences” from European settlers?
The demographicsdwhich “sub-populations” were more
numerous, which rarer, which entirely extinctdhad changed
radically from the historically common distributions, and were still,
in the middle of the 19th century, undergoing rapid and fairly un-
predictable changes. What, under these circumstances, does it
mean to speak of the “average” cranial capacity of an “Indian”?
Even if one were to make some principled decisions regarding
the questions of appropriate sampling for determining the average
cranial capacity of the “populations” identified, a more funda-
mental problem would remain. The groups identified by Morton
are not obviously “races” (nor even “populations”) in any biologi-
cally respectable sense. Leaving aside some of the more egregious
(but perhaps historically understandable) errors, such as lumping
Australian aboriginals and Native Africans together in one “race”
(Morton, 1849 vi) (see also Gould, 1978 508), it simply isn’t at all
clear what the (actual) biological status of the “groups” that Morton
identified might be. So, for example, Morton treats “Mexicans” as
one of two subgroups in the “Toltecan Family” (along with “Peru-
vians”), which itself is a member of the Native American “race” (or
“Group”dmore below onMorton’s often confused and inconsistent
taxonomic practices). Should we interpret this as a claim about the
actual taxonomic status of these groups? If so, it is clearly wrong,
but worse, it is not clear what would be right (who count as
“Mexicans” in this context?). Even contemporary practices with
respect to identifying and naming significant populations below
the species level are controversial and often confused, and this kind
of enterprise is still often contentious; are the groups identified
supposed to be (perhaps temporary) clades (Andreasen, 2004)?
Population-genetic clusters (Rosenberg et al. 2002)? Ecotypes
(Pigliucci & Kaplan, 2003)? A population identified by interactions
(Millstein, in press)? Whether a particular group is biologically12 Morton also excluded “idiots” from the tables of averages, but gives little sense
of who counts as an “idiot” in this context (see Morton, 1849 IX and Morton, 1850
246). More generally, what method of testing should be used to identify idiots? If
one population has a larger proportion of “idiots” than another, should this count
against them in some way? Either answer seems defensible, depending on what
one wanted to do with the answer. More on this problem below.
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for, and on one’s beliefs about what constitutes a biologically
meaningful group (Kaplan & Winther, 2013, 2014; Winther &
Kaplan, 2013; Winther, 2014). Morton’s answers to these ques-
tions are indefensible, and there remains no straightforward way to
answer them.
Indeed, it is not always clear how Morton thought about or
referred to the various “levels” of population organization he
studied. For example, the nesting of “Families” within “races” and
subgroups within “Families” is not particularly clear in Morton.
Putative populations are identified by different names in different
places, it is often unclear from the text intowhich group a particular
individual should be placed, or how smaller populations should be
put together into larger “Families,” etc. Brace, who provides a
vigorous defense of Morton against “Whiggish” interpretations of
his work, especially Gould’s, notes that there is “complete” confu-
sion in Morton’s distinctions between “species,” “races,” “groups,”
“primitive varieties” and the like (Brace, 2005 86).13 Lewis et al.
note in passing that “studies have demonstrated that modern hu-
man variation is generally continuous, rather than discrete or
‘racial,’ and that most variation in modern humans is within, rather
than between, populations” and hence it is only “with substantial
reluctance that we use various racial labels” (Lewis et al. 2011 2).
But the labels that they use, and the groups that they identify, are
not obviously the same as those used by Morton, nor the same as
those used by Gould, nor did Gould always follow Morton’s
(inconsistent) classificatory practices. It is clear in neither Gould
nor Lewis et al. whether the attempt is to recreate Morton’s
reasoning, as closely as possible, or if it is to apply more modern
standards to Morton’s work; both Gould and Lewis et al. seem to
slide uncomfortably between these very different projects, and the
impossibility of rigorously recreating Morton’s less-than-fully
consistent classificatory schemes make the entire project that
much more difficult. This is especially true in light of modern,
biologically informed concepts of populations and races to which
Morton did not have access.
Again, though, even if one were to make an informed and
principled decision regarding what kinds of groups one cared
about, and what the biological criteria for those groups might be,
Morton’s dataset does not include the necessary information that
could permit us to categorize the skulls into those groups. This isn’t
surprising; Morton himself simply could not have organized his
samples in ways that would make sense to us, since the concepts
necessary to do so were not fully developed until after the Modern
Synthesis in evolutionary biology and the techniques to identify
and sort individuals by sub-population are still being actively
developed and debated about today (Kalinowski, 2011; Rosenberg
et al. 2002).
The problem of sampling compounds the troubles noted above:
even if we had a principled reason to specify some particular
question from among the possible questions suggested, figuring out
how to go about answering it, given the need to specify (sub)
populations from which to sample, seems at best difficult. When
the problem of “acquiring” skulls is taken into account, the hope-
lessness of the sampling problem is made obvious: if one’s sam-
pling technique is “I include whatever skulls people send to me”13 Confusions surrounding these levels may bare on some of the arguments sur-
rounding Gould’s treatment of Morton’s work, especially Gould’s claims regarding
Morton’s failure to calculate certain “Indian subsample means” (Gould, 1978 505),
claims that Lewis et al. (2011) argue are clearly false.
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appropriate for any purpose, let alone the purpose specified.14
The absurdity of Gould’s “solution” to this problemdcalculate
the mean of each “subpopulation” identified by Morton separately,
and then average thosedshould now be obvious. Despite what
some authors have claimed, Gould’s analysis was not wrong
because he deployed statistical methods that were too sophisti-
cated or anachronistic. Cook (2006), in her defense of Morton, may
be right that the “concept of grouped means is exceptionally diffi-
cult for students who lack a quantitative bent,” but that, even if
true, is surely irrelevant. The problem of unequal sample sizes is a
serious one, and needs to at least be addresseddeven Morton
recognized that. It was why, after all, he didn’t calculate a “grand
mean” for the “Caucasian” race: “No mean has been taken of the
Caucasian race collectively, because of the very great preponder-
ance of Hindu, Egyptian and Fellah skulls over those of the Ger-
manic, Pelasgic and Celtic families” (Morton, 1849 9). Morton
followed up on this reasoning later, noting that no fair “collective
comparison” could “be instituted between the Caucasian and Negro
groups in such a table, unless the small-brained people of the latter
division (Hottentots, Bushmen and Australians) were proportionate
in number to the Hindoos, Egyptians and Fellahs of the other
group” (1850 248). Gould’s (reasonable) complaint was thatMorton
did not apply this same logic to the Native American group. As
Weisberg notes, Gould’s complaint that “Morton included small-
headed Inca Peruvians in the American mean, but excluded
small-headed Hindus from the Caucasian mean,” and that “[t]his
allowed Morton’s American sample to appear smaller and Cauca-
sian sample to appear bigger than it might have been otherwise,” is
surely justified (Weisberg, 2014 173)15.
The issue with Gould’s “mean of means” approach is that the
statistical techniques he deployed were applied to a problem that
only superficially resembles the problems for which they are
appropriate. The groups identified are not independent entities, they
do not represent populations of equal size (neither in 1839/49, nor
historically before the populations were decimated), most of the
samples are too small for it to make sense to treat them as repre-
sentative (even excluding those that consist of a very few, or even a
single, individual), and the groupings of “races,” “populations,” etc.,
bear no obvious resemblancewhatsoever to biological reality. Under
these conditions, there is no way to generate a reasonable approxi-
mation to the valuesof thepopulations fromwhich the sampleswere
drawn, and the “mean ofmeans” approach just generates an entirely
new meaningless metric based upon the old meaningless metrics.
All of this, however, presupposes that Gould was right about the
reason that Morton took to measuring skulls and reporting “racial”
averages, that is, that Morton really was attempting to calculate the
average cranial capacity of members of the various major “races” in
order to support a hierarchical ranking of the intellectual capacity14 This is, we admit, an unfair summary of Morton’s sampling technique; Morton
used skulls found in archeological burial sites, “acquired” from near-contemporary
cemeteries, as well as those that were sent to him, often accompanied by notes on
the providence, by various people in the field. In addition, he actively sought skulls
from populations that he felt were underrepresented in his samples (see Morton,
1849). But our point is that none of these is a “good” sampling method, and
there is no reason to think that Morton’s collection of skulls was representative of
the populations fromwhich the skulls were drawn, always keeping in mind that the
concept of a “population” is contentious in this context.
15 Some of Gould’s suggestions and criticisms of Morton’s work, it should be clear,
are anachronistic, and perhaps deliberately so. His removal of the “Australoid
family” from the “Negro mean,” on the grounds that we now know those pop-
ulations not to be closely related is one example (Gould, 1978 508), and his notes
concerning the correlation between brain size and body size (see e.g., Gould, 1978)
506) are another place where Gould’s methods rely on information of which
Morton could not have been expected to be aware.
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(Buikstra, 2009; Cook, 2006) in denying this. Buikstra (2009) in
particular argues that claims about “intellectual capacity” formed at
best a small fraction of Morton’s writing, and that for all the
attention Morton’s cranial capacity measurements have received,
these toowere a fairly minor part of Morton’s overall project (p. 27).
She writes that:
In Crania Americana, the small table reporting means and
ranges for cranial capacity appeared almost an afterthought, at
the end of the brief discussion of Morton’s conclusions and did
not affect them. One can almost hear the author thinking that he
had collected all these data and since others may be interested,
he should include them. They were not referenced earlier in the
text and were certainly not fundamental to his arguments.
(Buikstra, 2009 28)
DeGusta and Lewis argue that rather than hoping to establish that
there was an objective racial hierarchy based on intelligence as gov-
erned by skull size, “Morton hoped to determine whether different
human populations were one species or many, and thus whether the
divine creation had been singular or a play in several acts” (DeGusta &
Lewis, 2011). Similarly, Brace argues that Morton in fact was a strong
proponent of polygenism, and that his advocacy for that position
colored many of his views and interpretations of ethnographic data
(Brace, 2005 83e86). Cook (2006 38) however, denies that Morton
was even particularly interested in defending the theory of polygeny
(though he clearly supported it), let alone in developing empirical
arguments for the presumed intellectual rankings of the races. Mor-
ton’s intentions are thus not at all clear.
If Morton’s goal in collecting and measuring the skulls of
different races was to support polygenist theories, it is obvious that
the project was hopeless, and that arguments over which skulls to
include or exclude, how to group the skulls, or even whether the
skulls represent a reasonably representative sample of the pop-
ulations from which they were drawn, are completely moot. There
are no measurements that could, given what we know today,
support polygenist theories, because those theories, requiring as
they do that species be the result of separate creation events, are at
odds with basic evolutionary biology.
If we accept that Morton wished to use his skulls to make in-
ferences about the populations from which those skulls were
drawn, do his measurements of cranial capacities give us reasons
to think that these inferences will be particularly robust or
meaningful? The answer, we submit, is clearly no. Here, to un-
derscore the futility of the arguments surrounding the best ways
to summarize the data, we performed an analysis of variance
(ANOVA) on Morton’s skull volume data. Again, this does not
imply that we believe Morton’s data can be used for any useful
purpose; rather we wanted to see if there was any substantial
systematic variation in skull sizes among Morton’s poorly sourced,
non-randomly sampled, and ill-conceived, “races” at all. We found
that the vast majority of the variance in skull size is attributed to
individual differences (differences between individuals) within
Morton’s “families.” Only a small part is associated with the
average differences between “families” within Morton’s “races,”
and an even smaller part is associated with the “races” themselves
(see Supplemental Materials, online). In fact, the variance in skull
volumes among individuals is 44 times larger than the variation
among so-called “races”.16 Morton’s “races” therefore explain16 Weisberg makes a similar point qualitatively, noting that “since there is much
variation within races, and relatively small differences between the racial aggre-
gates,” Morton ought to have been “much more cautious about reporting means for
each race” (Weisberg, 2014 173).
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surprising considering the problems with his dataset that we have
already described. So in what sense, then, could Morton (or Gould)
possibly be “right” about anything, if there was virtually no sys-
tematic variation in skull sizes among Morton’s “races” to begin
with? It is obvious why different approaches to analyzing this data
yield such radically different answers; the small proportion of the
variance associated with Morton’s groups makes any analysis of
the data overly sensitive to trivial differences in decisions
regarding which skulls to include, how to treat the different
groups, what groupings to use, what statistical methodologies to
deploy, etc.
If Morton wasn’t collecting and measuring skulls to support the
intellectual ranking of the various races, nor to support polygenist
theories, why was he doing it?17 It is possible that Morton had no
particular purpose in mind. A fascination with skulls and mea-
surements could easily result in reams of data being gathered with
no guiding hypothesis to be tested. And given Morton’s strong in-
terests in “races,” summarizing the data along those lines might
have been, as Buikstra (2009) suggests, something of an after-
thought. In this context it is perhaps worth noting that at the same
time Morton was working so assiduously on his human skull col-
lections, he was also publishing detailed descriptions of e.g. fossil
crocodile skulls (Morton, 1845).
But if the human skulls were gathered and measured without
any clear purpose for which a summary of the datawould be useful,
the idea that there is a “correct” way to analyze the resulting data
should seem even less plausible. If the data collection scheme was
not guided by specific questions, then it is hard to see how any
statistical approach(es) could rescue that data for any particular
purposes later on. And the questions guiding the data collection
have to be well thought out too. To take a trivial example, if a
particular genus of plants, say, a kind of tree, has two extant species,
and we ask how tall a fully grown average member of the genus is,
it is unclear how one should answerdeven if one knows everything
there is to know about the trees in question. If one species is far
more common, and you interpret the question to be about the
average height of the individual trees in the world, a reasonable
answer might be approximately the average height of members of
the much larger population (the smaller one being statistically
swamped). But we might be interested not in the average height of
extant trees, but in the average height of the species within the
genus; here, Gould’s “mean of means” would be appropriate. If the
two species live in different areas, we might be interested in how
tall each kind grows, on average, where it is “native,” or we might
be interested in how tall they would grow under some more equal
environmental regime (the latter would be especially pressing if I
were considering the two trees as options for planting in front of
my house, for example). Whether we care about the proportion of
“juvenile” trees, and their heights, will again, depend critically on
the force of our question. Without a better specified questiond-
which often demands that we know what we want to do with the
answer, that is, why we are asking the questiondit isn’t at all clear
what methodology should be deployed.
In the end, the question “Whose statistical approach to sum-
marizing the skull volume data was right? Morton or Gould?” is17 It is clear that Morton had many beliefs about the intellectual abilities of the
different groups he identified and that his interpretations of skull features followed
this (see Weisberg, 2014 168e16); similarly, Morton’s support of polygenism is
undeniable. But whether this is why he collected, measured, and reported on skulls
is another matter. We take no stand on this question, and merely note that what
one thinks Morton was up to will influence what kind of data one thinks Morton
needed to gather given his interests, and what kinds of decisions would therefore
be better and worse justified.
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collected unsystematically, often of uncertain provenance (how
far should we trust the descriptions of where the skulls came
from that were sent to Morton along with the skulls?), and
identified in pre-modern fashion with no way to tie them back to
meaningful biological groups, could be usefully deployed to
answer any meaningful question about the larger populations
from which they were drawn. Neither Gould’s nor Lewis et al.’s
analysis is appropriate for answering many questions that a
reasonable person might want answered, in a modern context
where biological definitions of “race” and “population” are used
instead of arbitrary pre-modern delineations. Debates about how
best to summarize measurements of those skulls should be seen
as hopelessly misguided. That Gould permitted himself to get
sucked into such a debate is tellingdthe availability of another
way of analyzing the data clearly made doing so tempting to him.
Lewis et al. were right to call Gould out on this failure, but in the
end, they followed the same garden path, refusing to see that
trying to make use of Morton’s skulls for any interesting purposes
is just pointless.
The lesson here can be generalized: without knowing what
question(s) a particular dataset is meant to answer, it is hard to
evaluate the quality of the data. Data that would be reliable for
some purposes might be quite unreliable for others. Arguments
over the “best”ways of treating data should be seen as secondary to
evaluating whether the data is adequate to the purposes one hopes
to use it for. Where the data is simply inadequate to the purposes to
which is it pressed into service, that is the only conclusion that
ought to be drawn.6. Skulls and brain size in context: race and racism in the
contemporary literature
What does it mean to write that the “data on cranial capacity
gathered by Morton are generally reliable, and he reported them
fully” (Lewis et al. 2011 6)? Is the claim merely that Morton accu-
rately measured those skulls that happened to fall into his collec-
tion, and whose measurements he happened to think were worth
including? Or is the claim rather that since “Morton’s methods
were sound,” we expect that if we surveyed cranial capacities using
larger and statistically sound samples from the same locations and
time periods, etc., and attempted to match the populations to those
that Morton thought he was sampling, we would find that the
average cranial capacities were similar to those reported by Mor-
ton?18 Lewis et al. are not entirely clear about this. And this seems
something that one ought to be very clear about.
Whatever Morton believed about the relationship between
cranial capacity, intelligence, and race, the belief that differences in
average cranial capacity explain differences in intelligence both
within and between the so-called “races” remains alive today.
While this position is defended explicitly by relatively few serious
academics, “relatively few” is not none, and those few academics
garner a significant amount of attention from outside academia,
much of it laudatory (any reader unconvinced of this need only
perform a simple Google search on the names of leading “re-
searchers” supporting these positions). And, in this literature,
Morton’s results are treated not as interesting historical curiosities,18 We take Gould’s argument to be that one would not expect the population
averages to reflect the averages reported by Morton. We remain convinced that that
is true, but have argued that Gould overstepped when he suggested that, given the
skulls in Morton’s collection, some different average should be expected (e.g.,
Gould’s 1978 Table 6). Rather, given the poor dataset, we suggest that no legitimate
inferences to “natural” populations can be drawn.
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example, Rushton & Rushton (2003) write that “Morton (1849) .
found that Blacks averaged about 500^ 3 less cranial capacity than
Whites. These results have stood the test of time” (p. 141) (see also
Rushton & Jensen, 2005 255; Rushton & Ankney, 2009 693 & 710).
It is difficult to take seriously the claim that Lewis et al. in fact
“find other things to admire in Gould’s body of work, particularly
his staunch opposition to racism” (Lewis et al. 2011 5) when the
thrust of their article is an utterly uncritical acceptance of Morton’s
“results” as accurate, and Gould’s as uniquely flawed.19 Lewis et al.
note that Morton “assigned a plethora of different attributes to
various groups, often in highly racist fashion,” (Lewis et al. 2011 5)
but these assignments are never critically explored, nor are the
relationships between these assignments and contemporary
research programs noted, even in passing. And it seems to us to be
irresponsible to claim, as Lewis et al. do, that “studies have
demonstrated that modern human variation is generally contin-
uous, rather than discrete or ‘racial,’ and that most variation in
modern humans is within, rather than between, populations”
(Lewis et al. 2011 2) without noting the ways in which this
consensus has been recently challenged, and the role that those
challenges have played in contemporary debates surrounding
biological racial realism (Edge and Rosenberg, in press; Edwards,
2003; Kaplan & Winther, 2013, 2014; Ludwig, in press; Pigliucci,
2013; Spencer, in press; Weiss and Fullerton, 2005; Winther,
2014; Winther et al., in press).
Whatever Morton’s goals in gathering and summarizing skull-
volume data by race, his work was, verifiably, used by racists to
defend e.g. the continued practice of slavery. As Brace notes, to-
wards the end of his life, Morton corresponded with John Calhoun,
an “outspoken slavery proponent,” and, as “a result of his corre-
spondence,” Morton sent Calhoun his major works, which
“confirmed Calhoun’s racial bigotry” and provided intellectual
grounding for his pro-slavery position (Brace, 2005 92). And, as
noted above, Morton’s work continues to be used to support po-
sitions associated with what are (in our view) appalling political
positions on the basis of wildly inadequate evidence. This is the
context in which a “defense” of Morton’s assumptions, methods,
and results must be understood.
For all that, continuing to ignore Gould’s real mistakes and flaws
would, indeed, be intellectually dishonest; no matter how much
one might prefer the results of Gould’s statistical summary, the
assumptions used in generating those summaries are simply not
supportable. But, there is also no reason to accept the assumptions
used byMorton in generating his original estimates, nor those used
by Lewis et al. in generating their (very similar to Morton’s)
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